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CAUSE IN THE CIVIL LAW
AND CONSIDERATION IN THE COMMON:
MUCH ADO ABOUT NOTHING
ROBERT L. I.NRY*
Cause in the Civil Law corresponds to consideration in the
Common. They are essentially the same in conception. Not that
the law as to cause and that as to consideration are identical in
detail; but cause, like consideration, is something artificial,'
which, in addition to consent, is said to be required to be pre-
sent at the time of the making of an agreement. If there is no
cause or consideration, even though the parties themselves
intend the agreement to be legally binding, it is denied legal
effect because of the absence of such form.
2
That the Common Law of today, as applied by the courts,
requires consideration no one will dispute. That three of the
principal Civil Law countries, France, Italy, and Spain require
cause would also seem difficult to deny, as their codes expressly
prescribe it.
The Code Napoleon Art. 1108, says:--
"Quatre conditions sont essentielles pour la vatidit6 d'une
convention:
Le consentement de la partie qui s'oblige;
Sa capacitg de contracter;
Un objet certain qui forme la mati~re de t'engagement;
Une cause licite dans Pobligation.
*J. D. (University of Chicago), D. C. L. (Oxford), Judge in the
mixed Courts of Egypt, formerly professor of law at the Universities
of Louisiana, Illinois, North Dakota and Iowa.
'Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (1936)
177.
'It is described as essentially a "form" by Holmes in "The Com-
mon Law" (1881) 273.
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And Art. 1131 says:-
L'obligation sans cause, ou sur une fausse cause, ou sur une
cause fflicite, ne peut avoir aucun effet. "
We need not here concern ourselves with the requirement
in Art. 1108 that the cause must be licite, nor with fausse cause
or cause illicite of Art. 1131. Three quite different principles
are involved. It will be sufficient to consider cause in its first
sense, as being something required to support or clothe an
obligation, and to leave aside entirely the quite different
principles involved where the question is: whether the cause is
false, that is where there is a failure of consideration; or
whether it is illicit, that is where the consideration or the object
is unlawful or contra bonos mores.
What then is meant by cause as used in the French Civil
Code in its sense as something in addition to consent required
to make a contract valid?
We shall have to go back to Domat, writing in the middle
of the Seventeenth Century for the answer, as it was he who
first formulated the doctrine in the shape in which it passed into
the French Code and from the latter into those of Italy and
Spain. There is no trace of such doctrine in the earlier French
jurists, such as Dumoulin and B. d'Argentr6; and Pothier who
wrote in the Eighteenth Century and whose work served as
the foundation for the Code Napoleon contents himself with
reproducing the conception of Domat.
3
In setting forth his doctrine, Domat begins by pointing out
that in the case of synallagmatic, i.e. bilateral contracts the
obligation is never assumed gratuitously. The engagement by
one party is the foundation for that of the other party. As to
"real' '3 contracts, which are unilateral, such as a loan of
money, the obligation of the borrower is preceded by something
given by the lender. Thus in all such cases, of synallagmatie
and "real" contracts, the obligation of one of the contracting
'Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1029 and 1032.
3 A "real" contract is one having its origin in the delivery of
a res, or thing, money, goods or services. A unilateral contract is one
executed on one side at the very moment of its inception, leaving an
obligation subsisting on one side only. A bilateral contract is one of
mutual obligations.
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parties always has as its cause something coming from the other
party; and the obligation is void if in reality it is without such
cause.
4
In the case of donations, says Domat, the engagement of the
donor has as its foundation some reasonable or just motive, such
as a service rendered or some other merit of the donee, or the
mere pleasure of doing good. And this motive takes the place
of a cause moving from him who receives and gives nothing.5
Except for his third category, namely donations, Domat's
cause is strikingly like the Common Law consideration of his
day. In fact in the latter part of the 16th Century, that is just
before Domat, the English Courts used the terms cause and
consideration synonymously. 6
Domat does not say that he derived any part of his theory
from the Common Law, and we should hardly expect him to do
so. He was ostensibly writing about the law of France of his
day. He paid little attention to the customary law and confined
himself almost wholly to that part of French law whose roots go
back to the Roman, that is to the principles of the received law
which had been or which he thought ought to be applied in his
country.
For his doctrine of cause, as for his other principles, Domat
cites texts in the Corpus Juris Civilis of Justinian. But they
give him very little support.7 It is quite certain that the Roman
Law had no theory of cause or consideration; and in fact it
did not require causa or anything of the sort to give validity to a
contract.8
Planiol who is the author of the standard elementary
treatise on the Civil Law used today by students in France,
makes the following observations on the supposed Roman origin
of the ideas of Domat :9
'Domat-Liv. I, Tit. I, Sec. I, No. 5.
Domat-Liv. I, Tit. I, Sec. I, No. 6.
1 Sidenham and Worlington-In the Common Pleas, Easter Term
1585, Reported in 2 Leonard 224.
'Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1031.
'Buckland and McNair-Roman Law and Common Law (1936)
171-6.
'Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1031. The three following
paragraphs are not a full or literal translation but what Planiol says
in substance.
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As to donations, some of the jurisconsults speak of causa
donandi meaning the motive which the donor had in giving.
Domat's innovation consists in attaching decisive importance to
causa, while the Romans gave it none;
As to "real" contracts, Domat substituted the word causa
where the ancients employed the word res, for which there is no
justification whatever;
As to synallagmatic contracts the conception of Domat is
entirely modern. He tries to found it on texts saying that in
the absence of a real or lawful causa, money or property parted
with may be recovered. But the texts cited by him concern
cases of failure of consideration; and in the domain of quasi-
contract, cases of unjust enrichment; and have nothing to do
with something the presence of which is supposed to be required
at the moment of the formation of a contract, to give it formal
validity.
A demonstration that Domat did not in fact get his theory
of cause from the Roman Law, because the Romans had no such
theory, does not prove, however, that Domat was not sincere in
thinking that his doctrine fitted the facts of that law. Without
doubt he examined the various categories of contract and saw
what he thought was a common element in them all, though in
the case of donations and promises to give, the cause which he
found was somewhat different from that in other cases, in that
it was not what we should call a valuable consideration. He
must have been familiar with the passage in the Institutes of
Justinian which states that a voluntary promise whether in
writing or not binds the promisor to deliver what he promised.
Any open declaration of intention was sufficient. 10
That Domat did not in fact get his doctrine from the Roman
Law does not of course prove that he got it from the Common
Law. He may have originated it himself. He is in fact said to
be its creator. 12  Or he may have gotten his theory from some
source other than the Common Law. The fact is, that the funda-
mental notion that something in addition to consent is necessary
to make an agreement legally valid is much older than Domat
11 Institute of Justinian Book 2, Title 7, Sec. 3.
'" Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1029.
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or the Common Law of the Sixteenth Century. We find it in
the Norman Custumul of the Thirteenth and in the Italian
Glossators of the Twelfth Century.'3
The origin of both the theory of cause in the modern Civil
Law and of consideration in the Common may in fact be traced
back to the same source, namely to the Glossators. It is probable
that their teachings came to Domat in a similar way to that in
which they reached the judges who gave the Common Law the
rule as to consideration. Both Domat and those judges had
masters who taught them Roman Law; and it must have been
through such masters that the tradition from the Glossators
reached them.
But as Domat does not reveal to us the real source of his
theory, while the judgments of the English courts do indicate
clearly where the rule as to consideration came from, it would
seem best to reserve a discussion of its origin for the latter part
of this article, having to do with the story of consideration in
the Common Law.
As to the merits of the doctrine of cause introduced into the
French Law by Domat, Planiol considers the theory of cause:
1) false, at least in two out of three of Domat's categories;
and 2) utterly useless.14
As to synallagmatic contracts, Planiol says, "Two persons
obligate themselves the one to the other, for example a buyer and
a seller. Is it necessary to say that the obligation of the one is
the 'cause' of the obligation of the other? There is a logical
impossibility in that: the two obligations, arising from the same
contract, are born at the same time; they are twin sisters; it is
impossible for one of them to be the cause of the other, for a
cause and its effect cannot be exactly contemporaneous. It is a
vicious circle. If each of the two obligations is the effect of the
existence of the other, neither one can be born. The phenomenon
of mutual production is incomprehensible. Therefore the idea
is false. "15
"As to 'real' contracts the 'causalists' say that the obliga-
tion of the borrower, the depositary, the pledgee, has as its
cause the thing which he receives. They do not perceive that
" 2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2d ed.) 212.
"Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1037.
' Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1038.
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what they here call cause of the obligation is nothing else but
the fact which gives rise to the obligation (fait g6nirateur). If
one may call that the cause of the obligation, it is using the word
cause in the sense of the source which produces it, which is a
sense entirely different from that in which the modern jurists
use it in their theory of cause. To say that the thing received
is the cause of the obligation is playing on the double sense of
the word 'cause' ,.16
"As to liberalities the modern authors tend to discard the
ideas of Domat only to lose themselves in a deeper error. Domat
saw the cause of a liberality in the motive which inspires it,
more recent authors wish to distinguish cause and motive. They
find the cause of a donation in the will to give, (volontg de
donner), considered in an abstract way and independently of
the motives which give rise to it. Such conception has always
seemed to me devoid of sense. *What is will without motive?
How can one appreciate its moral value?"17
As to the matter of utility, Planiol says, "There can be no
such thing as absence of cause in the case of unilateral acts such
as real contracts or donations. In the matter of deposit or loan,
for example, it is clear that there can be neither a depositary
nor a borrower in a case in which the thing has not been given.
The absence of cause confounds itself here with the absence of
the contract; nothing has been done which could be declared nul
for default of cause."
"In the matter of donations, the absence of cause would be
the absence of motive: a donation therefore without cause would
be the act of a madman, of a person devoid of reason."
"The 'causalist' authors therefore cannot apply their idea
of nullity for absence of cause except to synallagmatic con-
tracts. If the thing sold does not exist, the obligation of the
seller is void in default of an object; that of the buyer is nul in
default of a cause because the obligation of the seller which
should constitute the cause never was born. One can arrive at
the same result without the intervention of the idea of cause, by
the simple nature of the synallagmatic contract which pre-
supposes reciprocal promises, (prestations); each party only
intends to bind himself in consideration of the advantage he is
Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 138.
' Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 138.
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to receive from the other, and the reciprocity which makes bind-
ing the two engagements is a relationship of mutual dependence
entirely distinct from the relationship of causality. The proof
of that is that the obligation of the buyer to pay the price falls
also and for the same reason, if the obligation of the seller to
deliver the thing, although legally formed and existing, receives
no execution: the buyer is released and yet his obligation does
not lack a cause."
But the reader in a Common Law jurisdiction has no doubt
already before reaching this point said to himself "it is all very
well for a treatise writer to say that the theory of cause is all
foolishness, but what I want to know is, what do the courts of
France, Italy, and Spain do about the matter? They can
hardly ignore it, as their codes say an obligation without cause
is void."Is
That is precisely the question I put to myself on taking up
my work on the bench of a Civil Law jurisdiction. I had a vast
number of contract cases to decide. It was rather nonplused
at first to find that the lawyers never spoke of cause or considera-
tion. I could understand the lawyers for the plaintiffs not doing
so in the absence of a law of pleading or any requirements as to
essential allegations. But what I could not understand was why
sometimes the lawyers for the defense did not point out that the
contracts as stated by the plaintiffs lacked cause and hence were
void. I decided that I must look into the jurisprudence, i.e. the
reports of cases, on the subject. I was unable to find any case
in the jurisprudence of France or Egypt which held an agree-
ment void for want of a cause. There were cases which did so
where the cause was fausse or illicite, but they obviously had
nothing to do with the problem with which I was concerned.
I doubt very much whether any court in a Civil Law jurisdic-
tion has ever held a contract obligation void for want of a cause.
It has been said "that if cause were not mentioned in the French
Code-and many modern codes say nothing about it in their
dispositions as to the formation of contracts,19-no difficulty
would be found in reaching the same results. In every case
where a contract is annulled for want of a cause, or because the
'Planiol-Droit Civil-Tome II, Sec. 1039.
" E. g. the German and the Swiss Codes.
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cause is illegal or immoral, there is no object, or else there is an
unlawful object; and the theory as stated amounts to very
little. " 20
It is quite accurate to say then that it amounts to nothing
at all in litigation, as the results would be precisely the same
whether in each case an inquiry were made as to whether cause
is present, in order to determine whether the court will
recognize the agreement as legally binding, as is done in Com-
mon Law jurisdictions with respect to consideration, or whether
the matter is completely ignored by bar and bench.
Then if we take into consideration the immense literature
in France and Italy on the subject; the fact that "it is the most
discussed and most indecipherable problem of modern legal
literature, the battle ground for metaphysical elucubrations and
juridical psychology",21 we may well say of the story of cause
that it is "Much Ado About Nothing".
It may seem to the reader that this result of nullity would
not have been reached if Domat's doctrine of cause had not con-
tained two contradictory principles. He says in one breath that
certain kinds of contracts are only valid where there is a cause,
by which he means a valuable consideration; and in the next
that donations, which include promises of liberalities, may also
be valid if there is another sort of cause.
If he had classified all promises into two sorts, those for
which something is given in exchange, and those for which
nothing is given, and had said that in the first case something
must be given, and in the second nothing, his doctrine would
obviously have amounted to nothing at all
But Domat did not do that. His three categories do not
cover the whole field of contracts. There are quite a number of
different sorts of promises for which nothing is given in
exchange which are not liberalities, such as those to pay debts
barred by the Statute of Limitations, those discharged in
bankruptcy, and promises to perform voidable obligations.
The Common Law, which does divide all promises into two
classes, those for which consideration is given and those for
Amos and Walton, Introduction to French Law, 163.
Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Common Law (1936)
175 (quoting the Italian jurist Bonfante).
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which it is not, has to resort to the very lame expedient of
making exceptions to uphold those promises which are not of
liberalities. 22
The Civil Law Classification is much more clean cut, and
scientific. The Roman Law had its special dispositions as to
liberalities and the modern Civil Law has them also. The Code
Napoleon provides that all donations, which include promises of
liberalities, must be made by act authentique and must be
accepted in the same way.23 The effect is obviously to put
promises of liberalities in a class by themselves, and there is no
reason why a different rule as to cause should not be applied to
them, or one requiring a cause at all, as their validity or
invalidity is determined in another way. It should be observed
also that Domat did not say that the cause in the case of
liberalities was the desire to give. He merely says such "motive
takes the place of a cause", which is quite different.
With liberalities in a compartment by themselves the courts
of France might very well have required a cause in the sense of
a valuable consideration as to all other promises, for the require-
ment of cause is laid down in the Code as applicable to contracts
in general. But the fact is they have not; perhaps because they
perceived that as Domat's categories did not cover the entire
field, his test is false; but more probably because the true test
of intent had been perceived and found sufficient in itself.
The whole blame should not be placed on Domat, for he did
not profess to lay down a rule for all sorts of contracts. He
merely observed that in two sorts there was a valuable considera-
tion given in exchange for the promise, and in a third sort none.
Pothier should share the blame for having repeated, what Domat
said, without comment; and the drafters of the Code Napoleon
for incorporating a general requirement of cause into their code,
supposedly adopting Pothier, but failing to perceive that he was
not laying down a general rule, and that his rules, taken from
Domat, were in fact nothing but truisms, and of absolutely no
value as a test of the validity of contracts.
We come then to the question, how did it happen that the
Common Law has the test of consideration?
' Restatement, Contracts, Secs. 85-94.
' French Civil Code, Secs. 931-2.
K. L. J.-2
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We know it appeared rather suddenly in the last third of
the 16th Century24 in cases in which the action was Trespass on
the Case.
Two explanations have been offered. One is that there was
something inherent in that writ which gave rise to it. The other
is that by the use of that action for breach of contract the doors
of the royal courts were opened to parol contracts, and the
judges were faced for the first time with the necessity of find-
ing a rule for determining what parol promises to hold action-
able and what not, and found it in the presence or absence of
consideration.
As to the theory that consideration arose from something
inherent in the writ used, Ames having demonstrated that
Assumpsit developed out of Case in the form of deceit, 25
suggested that consideration came from the allegation in that
writ, of the detriment suffered from the deceit. But there is
not the slightest evidence in the cases that the allegation of
deceit was ever taken seriously. The judges realized, that the
breach of a contract was not a deceit, but that they were allowing
a tort action to be used in contract cases. . They never confused
consideration, which they required to be present at the forma-
tion of a contract, with the damages suffered from the breach. 20
As to the second and generally accepted theory, there would
seem, also, little in the facts to support it. In the first place it
is not a fact that parol contracts were not actionable in the royal
courts before Case became available for breaches of contract.
Parol contracts had always been actionable under the writ of
Debt. In its origin Debt was the generic and general form of
action for every sort of claim known to the law.27 It appears in
the earliest royal court rolls. Quite early Covenant also became
available. With its advent Debt became restricted to claims for
definite sums of money.28 For any other sort of contract claim,
2 The leading cases are collected in Willistons Cases on Con-
tracts. They are Hunt v. Bate (1568), Smith and Smith Case (1583),
and Sidenham v. Worlington (1585).
'Ames, J. B., The History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 Harv. L.
Rev. 1.
'Ames' theory is fully discussed by the author in Consideration
in Contracts 601 A. D. to 1520 A. D. (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 664.27As late as Edward I it was used by the purchaser of land who
had paid his money, against the vendor who would not enfeoff him.
Year Book 21, 2 Edw. I, p. 599.
2 Pollock and Maitland, History of English Law (2nd ed.) 210.
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whether based on a writing or on a simple parol agreement,
Covenant lay.29 Later that writ was restricted to claims based
on writing under seal.30
When that stage had been reached, it is assumed that parol
covenants were no longer actionable. It is recognized that Debt
was still available. But, it is said, it was conceived of as
'proprietary' in character ;31 that it was only available in certain
definite situations; that it was not brought for the breach of a
promise; and that it could not, generally speaking, be brought
for breach of parol covenants.
It is true that, except when used to create contracts of court
record, or brought on recognizances under seal, Debt was rarely
used except in four cases: (1) against a surety, (2) for money
lent, (3) for the price of goods sold, (4) for arrears of rent.
32
But it should be observed that those were the common every-
day transactions, and that the action was not restricted even as
to them. It could be brought whenever the claim was for a
sum certain.33
And the injured party, in situations in which the claim was
not for a sum certain, was not left without a remedy. In every
case in which the breach of a contract gave one party the right
to bring Debt, a way was found to give the other party a remedy,
when he was the injured one. Thus where a chattel was sold,
bailed, or let, the buyer, bailor or lessor could recover the chattel,
or damages for its unlawful detention by the writ of Detinue.
Case was first allowed for breach of contract in order to
provide a reciprocal remedy to the buyer of land, who had paid
the price, but had not been enfeoffed. 34 There was, however not
a single type of unilateral contract, one executed on one side at
the time of its inception, which was not before actionable, which
became so as a result of the use of Case for breach of contract.
But it may be said that Case, at any rate, was the writ which
admitted bi-lateral contracts, those executory on both sides, con-
sisting of a promise given for a promise.
Id. at 218.
Id. at 219.
Id. at 205.
Id. at 210.
Ibid.
4Year Book 20 Hen. VI, Chap. 34, pl. 4; Year Book 3 Hen. VII,
14, pl. 20. The reciprocal remedy in such a case could earlier have
been had in Debt before it was restricted to sums certain. Year
Book 21-2, Edward I, p. 599.
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It was held in Strangborough and Warner,8 5 "that a promise
upon a promise will maintain an action upon the case", and that
is probably the first case which sanctioned that type of contract,
when made without earnest. It should be observed, however, that
the bi-lateral bargain with God's penny or earnest had been
recognized for centuries. In 1303 it was provided by the Carta
Mereatoria of Edward I that among merchants the God's penny
binds the contract of sale so that neither party may resile from
it. 36  Long before that it was the general rule that the person
who received the earnest, whether merchant or not, was bound by
his bargain. Generally such contracts were handled by the local
courts, but they must also have been actionable in the central.
Therefore by Strangborough and Warner the doors were not
opened to bi-lateral contracts in general, they had always been
open as to them, as well as to uni-lateral, but only to promises
given for promises, when no earnest had been given by either
party. And the holding in that case was not due to the form of
action employed. It is rather to be attributed to the fact, that
the rule of consideration had already been adopted before that
case was decided, and its adoption facilitated the holding. If a
promise can be a consideration for an act, and an act for a
promise, it follows that a promise may be supported by a promise.
However, it is probable that the decision would have been the
same, even if consideration had not been thought of. The time
was ripe for it. Earnest was a form a wed, and it had already
been held that a surety was bound even when he had received no
wed.37 The old ceremonial forms were going out, and the courts
looked to the substance. They recognized without hesitation
every form of contract in general use.
It is certain, then, that the premise is quite erroneous which
would attribute to Case the opening of the doors to parol agree-
ments in general, or even to new types of them. But admitting
that, it may still be argued; that the availability of Case, by
augmenting the number of contract cases coming before the royal
courts was the cause of the formulation of the consideration rule
in the latter part of the 16th Century; that before the advent of
In the Queen's Bench, 1588 or 1589. Reported in 4 Leonard, 3.
'At a later date this rule passed into the Common Law, 2 Pol-
lock and Maitland, History of English Law (2nd ed.) 209, citing Noy,
Maxims c. 42.
'Year Book, 12 Hen. VIII, q. ii, pl. 3 (1520).
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Case in assumpsit, the number of parol contract cases were too
few to give the courts concern, or to make them feel the neces-
sity of finding a test.
It is a fact that, during the 12th, 13th, 14th and 15th Cen-
turies, the proportion of contract cases before the central courts
was relatively small, and most of those adjudicated were upon
covenants under seal. During those centuries the great bulk of
parol contracts were handled in the local courts3
7
It is also a fact that the availability of Case, in the 16th
Century, increased the number of parol contract cases, due to
the fact that the defendent could not wage his law against that
form of action as he could when the writ was Debt. If the action
was brought in a local court, law could be waged in defense.
Plaintiffs, therefore, brought cases into the king's courts by the
writ of Case in assumpsit, to escape law.
But admitting that there was a larger flow of parol con-
tracts to the royal courts in the 16th Century, it is not a fact
that there were not enough of such cases adjudicated, during the
four previous centuries, to give the courts the occasion to apply
the consideration test. There had been in fact, hundreds of them,
perhaps thousands, including all of the various types of contracts
in common use. There had been full opportunity for finding and
applying a test, such as consideration, during those four centuries
and the first two thirds of the 16th, if a need for a test had been
felt.
But the fact is that it had not. There is not the slightest
evidence in a single case, during those five centuries that the
consideration test was applied consciously or unconsciously.
The courts simply went on following their own precedents, and
where there were none, sought the law where they always did
under such circumstances, in the custom of the country. There-
fore, it is evident that the slight increase in the volume of paroF
contract business, induced in the 16th Century, by the avail-
ability of Case in the form of assumpsit, was not what caused
the courts to look, for the first time, for a test. If they did in
fact adopt the consideration test in the latter part of the 16th
Century, because at that time the necessity for such a test was
1" "Contracts in the Local Courts of Medieval England"--Long-
mans, Green & Co. (1926) by the author.
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felt, it must have been because the old forms were breaking
down; and without such forms to guide them they sought some
other test.
That is a plausible thesis. To ascertain, however, whether
or not it is the correct one, it will be necessary to examine care-
fully the first cases in which the consideration test was
applied.
We have already noticed the case of Strangborough and
Warner in which the subject matter was precisely an old type
of contract where the traditional form had been omitted.
But it was observed as to that case, that it was not one of those
which gave rise to the consideration test, but one in which it was
applied, after it had first been adopted in other cases.
To ascertain the real origin of consideration it is essential
to examine the very first cases in which it appeared. The first
is Hunt v. Bate, decided in 1568. It will be given here in full as
reported by Dyer :3S---"The servant of a man was arrested,
and imprisoned in the Compter in London for trespass; and
he was let to mainprize by the manucaption of two citizens of
London (who were well acquainted with the master), in con-
sideration that the business of the master should not go undone.
And afterwards, before judgment and condemnation, the master
upon the said friendly consideration promised and undertook
to one of the mainpernors to save him harmless against the party
plaintiff from all damages and costs, if any should be adjudged,
as happened afterwards in reality; whereupon the surety was
compelled to pay the condemnation se. 31 £., etc. And there-
upon he brought an action on the case, and the undertaking was
traversed by the master, and found in London at risi prius
against him. And now in arrest of judgment it was moved that
the action does not lie. And by the opinion of the Court it does
not lie in this matter, because there is no consideration where-
fore the defendant should be charged for the debt of his servant,
unless the master had first promised to discharge the plaintiff
before the enlargement and mainprize made of his servant, for
the master did never make request to the plaintiff for his servant
to do so much, but he did it of his own head. Wherefore, etc."
"But in another like action on the case, brought upon a
promise of 20£. made to the plaintiff by the defendant, in con-
Dyer 272.
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sideration that the plaintiff, at the special instance of the said
defendant, had taken to wife the cousin of the defendant, that
was good cause, although the marriage was executed and past
before the undertaking and promise, because the marriage
ensued the request of the defendant. And land may be also
given in frank-marriage with the cousin of the donor as well
after the marriage as before, because the marriage may be
intended the cause, etc. And therefore the opinion of the Court
in this case this Term was, that the plaintiff should recover
upon the verdict, etc. And so note the diversity between the
aforesaid cases."
We should observe in the first place that the "report" is
in reality notes on two cases; the first paragraph is on Hunt v.
Bate, and the second on another, an unnamed case, which was
decided at the same term. The court in which the cases were
decided is not named, nor are the judges; and the judgment is
not given in the words of the court. The reporter simply gives,
in his own words, the decision in each case and the reason for it.
In Hunt v. Bate the court held that the master could not
be held on his promise because he "did never make request to
the plaintiff for his servant to do so much, but he did it of his
own head". In the other case the defendant was held "because
the marriage ensued the request of the defendant".
It was well established law that where a person gave credit
or changed his position at the request of another, the person who
made the request was bound. The original contract was the
surety contract made with the wed and borh ceremony, (the wed
being generally a stick which was handed to the borh, i.e. the
surety): and it was the surety only who was bound, not the
person we should call the debtor.39 The old ceremony had gone
out of use, and, long before Hunt v. Bate, it had been held that
even where no wed was given the surety was bound. It was
sufficient that he made the request.
But in Hztnt v. Bate the defendant never made a request
and hence never became a surety. That is all that it was neces-
sary for the court to say and apparently all that it did say, to
justify its refusal of plaintiff's demand. Certainly if the case
had given rise to a discussion by the court there would have
' See the articles by the author Forms of Anglo-Saxon Con-
tracts and Their Sanctions (1917) 15 Michigan Law Review 552 and
639.
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been a report of it. In the first case in which Case was brought
for breach of contract, there was a very full report of the
discussion. The exact words of everyone of the six judges is
given. 40 But in the report of Hunt v. Bate none of the words
of the court are given.
Under those circumstances, it would be difficult to believe
that the court was conscious of making the momentous decision
of giving the Common Law the consideration test. If they had
considered the case before them one of first impression, involving
a novel form of contract, or an old one in which the traditional
ceremony had been omitted; and in that situation had felt the
need of finding a new test in order to enable them to decide
whether the promise should be held legally binding or not, it is
certain that they would have indulged in an extended discus-
sion to justify the new rule they were about to apply. The least
they would have done was to review the precedents, to consider
the various types of contract which had been held binding, and
to extract from them a general principle. But they did nothing
of the sort.
There is not the slighetest indication that the court applied
a test or felt the need of one. Certainly the consideration test
was not applied. The word 'consideration' is used four times,
thrice in the note on the principal case, and once in that on the
unnamed case decided the same term. The word consideration
as defined in any dictionary has several different meanings.
It may mean, among other things; 1. deliberation, 2. impor-
tance, 3. motive or reason.41 It was in the third sense, (and not
in the technical legal sense it has since acquired), that it was
used in Hunt v. Bate. "In consideration that" means in order
that; "Friendly consideration" means because of the desire to
do a good turn to a friend; "Because there is no consideration
wherefore" means because there is no reason for; and "In con-
sideration that the plaintiff" means because of the fact that the
plaintiff.
But while there is no suggestion of consideration in the
principal case, there is in Dyer's note calling attention to the
diversity of the holding in another an unnamed case, decided
'Year Book, 20 Hen. VI, Chap. 34, pl. 4; A full translation of
that case is given in the article by the author Consideration in Con-
tracts. 601 A.D. to 1520 A.D. (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 664, 666.
1 Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary.
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the same term. Dyer uses the term "good cause" in much the
same sense that "good consideration" subsequently acquired in
the law. Ie says the fact that the plaintiff had taken to wife, at
the request of the defendant, the latter's cousin, "that was good
cause" for an action on the case brought upon a promise made
by the defendant to pay the plaintiff £20.
It is quite impossible for us to know whether or not, the
court, in that unnamed case, upheld the promise on the ground
that there was good cause to support it. Certainly there was no
necessity whatever for the court to drag in such a notion.
The case could have been decided in accordance with a long
series of precedents without more ado.
As we have seen, in the original, or surety contract, in
which the surety was the principal and only debtor, vis a vis
the promisee, the surety had been held for centuries where the
promisee had released the debtor from custody, accorded credit,
or in any way changed his position, at the request of the
surety.42  It was quite immaterial who got the benefit of the
promisee's act, or whether anyone else other than the surety
also became debtor to the promisee. The rule was applied to
analogous situations, which we should not look upon as of
suretyship.4 3 It was quite general. All that was necessary was
for the promisee to change his position at the request of the
promisor. Certainly in the unnamed case, in the note to Hunt v.
Bate, the man who had married the defendant's cousin had
changed his position at the request of the defendant.
But, if there was such a general rule, that wherever a
surety, (or anyone else in an analagous position), made a request
and the person to whom it was made complied with it, the surety
could be held, was the consideration test not, in effect, already
in operation? Ames says44 of the case in Year Book, (1520),
' Year Book 7, Edward II, f. 242, (A.D. 1314); Year Book 37,
Henry VI, 8, 18, (A.D. 1459); Year Book 12, Henry VIII, q. ii, pl. 3,
(A.D. 1520).
"In 1459, in Year Book 37, Henry VI, 8, 18, it was said: "If I
say to a surgeon, if he will go to one J. who is sick, and will give him
medicine, and will make him well, he shall have 160 shillings. Then
if the said surgeon goes to J. and gives him medicine and cures him,
he would have a good action of debt against me, although the thing
was done for another and not for me."
"Ames, J. B. The History of Assumpsit (1888) 2 Harv. L.
Rev. 1.
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12 Henry VIII, q. ii, pl. 3, holding a surety on a parol promise,
"From that day to this a detriment has always been deemed a
valid consideration."
But that is reading into the case a notion of a later genera-
tion. The court upheld the surety's promise not because the
detriment suffered at the latter's request constituted a good
consideration, but simply and solely because of the fact that
from time immemorial a person who had given credit to a surety,
who had delivered goods or done anything else in reliance on the
promise, had been allowed to recover. It was enforcing a type
of contract which had always been actionable. In early times
the wed ceremony had been used to mark the consent of the
surety to be legally bound. The old ceremony had gone out;
but the courts continued to hold the surety who had made the
request, which of itself could be considered sufficient to show
consent.
There is not the slightest suggestion in the cases during the
five centuries preceding Hunt v. Bate of the consideration test.
Certainly the courts did not enquire as to whether or not the
promisee had suffered a detriment. They simply followed
precedent and custom. They gave redress in those contract
situations, which, according to the understanding of the people,
were intended to create legal relations. It was only where the
promise was made as a part of one of the everyday common
business transactions, or could be implied from it, that the
promisor was held, and precisely because the promise was such
a part. It was not at all because the promisee had suffered a
detriment, a conception which had not even been thought of.
Cause, it would seem, was first mentioned and applied in
the unnamed case in Dyer's note to Hunt v. Bate. At least no
earlier case seems to have been found in which the notion
appears. A few years later, in 1583, we see the same idea crop-
ping up in Smith and Smith's Case.4 5 However it is there called
'consideration'. There was no more reason for dragging in the
notion, than in the unnamed case mentioned in the note to Hunt
v. Bate, in fact even less excuse for doing so. The court, in
Smith and Smith's case, could and should have rejected the
demand simply and solely on the ground that it was contrary to
IIn the Queen's Bench, Michaelmas Term, 1583,--Reported in 3
Leonard 88.
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public policy to enforce a contract which was entered into with
the object of gaining an unlawful advantage. The judgment
explicitly indicates that as the true ground for the decision,
when it says that the benefit intended should not be recognized
as "a consideration in law". What they really did was to apply
the Roman maxim, with which the court was undobutedly
familiar, ex turpis causa von oritur aetio. It has above been
pointed out in connection with the discussion of cause in the
Civil Law that causa used in that context has nothing whatever
to do with cazisa as a requirement for the creation of a valid
contract. The court held the contract invalid because of the
unlawfulness or turpitude of its object, and said, incidentally,
that there was want of "sufficient consideration", which had
nothing whatever to do with the case.
Two years later in the case of Sidenhan and Worlington
46
'consideration' is again used in the technical sense of something
given in exchange for a promise, and required to make it legally
actionable. The facts were similar to those in Hunt v. Bate,
except that the surety had requested the plaintiff to go bail.
The promise, as in the earlier case, was made later, but the court
held, that that was immaterial, that it was sufficient that the
request was made at the time. The court used the terms cause
and consideration as equivalent. Each time mentioned, they
were used in the alternative, i.e. the phrase "cause or considera-
tion" was employed.
Clearly there was no more need to talk of cause, or con-
sideration, than in the preceding cases of Hunt v. Bate and
Smith and Snzith's case. The contract involved was the typical
surety contract, in which the surety had been held for centuries,
and as to which there were precedents in the royal court holding
the surety, even where no wed had been given him.
With Sidenham and Worlington consideration became
firmly established as a rule of the Common Law. The require-
ment of consideration as a test simply slipped into our law with-
out discussion, or consideration, by the courts. It is quite clear
that it was not because the courts felt the need for it, that such
a test was adopted. There is not the slightest indication to that
effect, in the first cases in which it was applied. The courts
" In the Common Pleas, Easter Term, 1585-Reported in 2
Leonard 224.
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were not dealing with new types of contract, or old ones shorn
of their traditional forms which required a new test, other than
form. The first cases could all have been decided by simply
following precedents. Fortunately for us, the cases themselves
clearly indicate the veritable origin of consideration.
We have seen that in the unnamed case in Hunt v. Bate
the court used the expressions "good cause" and "may be
intended the cause", and in Sidenhan and Worlington it three
times used "cause or consideration", and Anderson said:-
"This action will not lie; for it is but a bare agreement and
nudumn pactum". Such language points clearly to the fact that
bench and bar were familiar with a heresy which originated with
the Italian Glossators of the 12th Century. It was their theory of
"vestments". They had worked out, from Roman Law texts,
the rule that all contracts must be clothed. The garment might
be a form, or it might be the special "investative" facts required
in a certain sort of contract. Such facts were said to be the
cause. For instance, as to "real" contracts, those contracted by
the delivery of a thing, there was the maxim "Re contrahitur
obligatio". It was the delivery of the thing which invested the
promise, and was its cause.
The Glossators were led into their theory by the passage in
the Corpus Juris of Justinian which says, that a bare pact does
not give rise to an obligation, but only to an exception. 47 The
inference is that if a nude or bare agreement does not create an
obligation it must follow that only agreements which are clothed
are contractual obligations.
But such interpretation overlooks the essential difference
between a pact and a contract. Contractus was the name for all
those agreements, or conventions which were enforceable by
action. "A pactum could not originate a contract. It was used
to dissolve a contract, or to vary and amplify the usual terms of
a contract, not to create one.' '48
To convey to the reader the true meaning of the maxim
concerning bare pacts I can do no better than to quote from
Hunter. "In the XII Tables a provision is made that if one
breaks the limb of another, unless he is forgiven, he must submit
4Nuda pactio obligationem non pait, sed parit exceptionem
Digest or Pandects Book 2, title 14, fragment 7, section 4.
Hunter, Roman Law (4th ed.) p. 549 and 546.
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to his own being broken. S'i nembrum rupsit in cum eo pacit
talio esto. The punishment of retaliation could not be avoided
except by coming to terms with the injured person. This is an
example of the rule that an agreement to waive an action for a
delict is binding and a good answer to the action. (Digest 2,
14, 7, 14.)"
"The effect of such a pact was entirely to take away the
sufferer's right of action. A special defense was not necessary
but, if it appeared that the sufferer had agreed not to sue the
wrong-doer, he was defeated. (Digest 2, 14, 17, 1.) 19
In other words a pact was a composition. "To pact" meant
to compound, not to contract. A bare pact meant one which
amounted to a forgiving or release of the right of retaliation and
gave the injured party no substituted rights against the wrong
doer or against the latters pledge or surety. Hence a bare pact
was a defense only. But most pacts were not bare. Usually the
injured party did not forgive. He sold out. The wrong doer
or one of his relatives either paid or bound himself to pay a
price or composition. In Roman law the bronze and balance
ceremony was used for that purpose. That was not a bare pact,
but what the Glossators would call an invested or clothed pact,
which gave right to an action for the amount agreed on.
To quote Hunter again: "At some period, which it would
be difficult to determine, but which was certainly before the time
of Cicero, (De Orat. 2, 24 Pro Publio Quintio, 5), the praetor
inserted a provision in his edict, making a pact a good defense
to an action on contract, as well as to an action on a delict.
He said, (Digest 2, 14, 7, 7), "I will support all pacts that do
not sin against good faith, or any statute, plebisciturm, senatus
cosultur or imperial constitution, and which are not an invasion
of these." ' 0
"The pact specially in view of the praetor was doubtless
the pact of release, (de non petendo); each contract had its
special divestitive as it had its special investitive facts. A con-
tract per aes et libram could be dissolved only per aes et libram.
A literal contract was terminated by writing; a stipulation by
4, Id. at p. 546.
OPacta conventa, quae neque dolo malo, neque adversus leges,
plebiscita, senatus consulta, edictus principium, neque quo fraus cui
eorum fiat, facta erunt, servabo, in footnote p. 546 Hunter-Roman
Law, 4th ed.
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a stipulation. A mere release from a formal contract had no
effect. But it would have been against good conscience to allow
a person to reimpose upon another, by taking advantage of the
forms of law, an obligation that he had deliberately though
informally, cancelled. The praetor, therefore, by inserting an
exceptio in the pleadings, practically enabled any contract to be
dissolved by mere consent, without any formality."
The Glossators evidently failed to appreciate that the word
'pact' as used in the rule that a nude pact will not support an
action, does not mean an agreement intended to create a con-
tractual obligation, but only one to release or compound a right
already created. Therefore it was not correct to conclude that
every actionable agreement must be clothed.
After once having arrived at the generalization that every
contract must have a 'vestment', it was simple enough to
identify "vestment" and causa. The "vestment" of each type
of contract known to the law was found in the special investitive
facts required to give it being, to "cause" it. The Roman
jurists never spoke of a "vestment", but they were continually
using the term causa in connection with obligations.5 1 They
used the term in many different senses just as we do "cause",
but it does not appear that they ever used it in a technical sense
to mean something required, in addition to consent, to create a
valid contractual obligation, which was the sense the Glossators
gave to it.
Long before Hunt v. Bate the word "consideration" had
acquired a legal significance. It was not so used in contracts,
nor in contract cases, but it did appear in a legal sense in deeds
of conveyance. It is said by Pollock and Maitland that:52-
"Every alienation of land, a sale, an onerous lease in fee farm,
is a 'gift', but no gift of land is gratuitous; the donee will
always become liable to render service, though it be but the
service of prayers. Every fine levied in the king's court will
expressly show a quid pro quo."
"In the very old Lombard laws we see that the giver of a
gift always receives some valueless trifle in return, which just
I causa donandi, turpis causa, justa or injusta causa, causa natu-
ralis, causa civilis, causa lucrativa, causa noxalis, etc.
The quotations are from History of English Law (2d ed.) Vol.
II, p. 213, the last one being in a note at the foot of the page.
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serves to make his gift not a gift but an exchange. When a fine
is levied in favor of a religious house, the "consideration"
stated in the chirograph is very often the admission of the
benefactor into the benefit of the monk's prayers."
For some reason, most probably induced from a study of
Roman Law which prohibited gifts of large amount, at least
unless they were registered, there was a strong feeling that gifts
of land might be considered invalid; and that therefore it was
safer to make them in the form of an exchange. At any rate
the practice became general of always putting in the deed a
quid pro quto. The word used to introduce the quid was
"consideration". For instance land might be given in con-
sideration of a peppercorn, or a fine levied in consideration of a
sparrow-hawk, or land given to a monastery in consideration of
prayers. "In consideration" meant "in order to get". "Con-
sideration" expressed the motive or inducement. But by a
simple transition of ideas the term came to mean the thing
induced or given in exchange. Thus the conveyancer would
say "for a peppercorn and other valuable considerations".
Also the word 'consideration' had already been used in
English courts in discussing the validity of uses. A use was
created by the will of the grantor, "but his will could not be
known by the court without sufficient proof of his intent; and
such proof might consist in the mutuality of the transaction, or
in the existence of a natural duty towards the cestui que use.
Either kind of reason was called consideration.' ' 3  Such
employment of "consideration" corresponds very closely to
Domat's "cause" which might consist of mutuality, in the case
of 'real' or synallagmatic contracts, or of the desire to benefit
in the case of liberalities. Holmes identified "consideration",
as so employed to make a gift not a gift, and to raise a use, with
the quid pro quo. And that is undoubtedly correct. But it
should always be kept in mind that up until the time of Hunt v.
Bate and Smith and Smith's case neither a quid pro pro nor a
"consideration" had ever been required for a contract.
We are dealing with an innovation, which came into the
Common Law, under the name of "cause"; and endeavouring
to account for the fact that very soon the word "consideration"
was substituted for "cause". It is very easy to see how that
' Waldi Pollock on Contracts (3rd ed.) by Williston, p. 190.
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came about. The courts had long been accustomed to the use
of the term "consideration", used in conveyances, in the sense
of something given in exchange for something else. Nothing
could be more natural once "cause" had been accepted in the
sense of something done or given, in exchange for a promise,
than to employ the more English sounding "consideration" in
the place of "cause" which obviously was a conception derived
from the Roman Law or what was supposed to be Roman Law.
But how did such a notion of the Glossators of Italy of the
12th Century get to the judges of the royal courts of England
of the 16th? In the first place Vacarius one of the most
distinguished of the Glossators was taken from Bologna to
England, in 1144, by Theobald, Archbishop of Canterbury.
It is said that the law school at Oxford was founded by
Vacarius. It is certain that his glosses were reverently received,
and for centuries were studied by those who became members of
the bar and bench of England.54
It should be remembered that in the 16th Century the
greater part of the reading of law students was in the Roman
Law. There was very little in the way of treatises on the Com-
mon Law, which could be studied. And we may be certain that
they learned the doctrine of the Glossators, that every contract
must have a cause. We see that teaching perpetuated in the
law study even of the present time,55 which goes to show the
persistence of tradition, the toughness of taught law.
The belief, then, of bench and bar, learned from their law
teachers, that in the Roman Law every contract required a cause,
in addition to consent, might of itself have been sufficient to
have induced them to require cause for contracts in the Com-
mon Law. If the Roman Law needed such a test, they would
think that the Common Law must also. There was such a
reverence for the Roman Law, that there was little hesitation in
borrowing a rule from it, where it did not run counter to the
traditional Common Law. And here was an excellent oppor-
4Hunter-Roman Law (4th ed.) p. 100; Pollock and Maitland,
History of English Law (2nd ed.) Vol. II, pp. 118-9.
"Hunter who has given us the standard text book on the Roman
Law, used today by English students, goes to great pains to find that
the Roman Law had the consideration test. Hunter, Roman Law
(4th ed.) pp. 490-516. It would be too much of a digression to dis-
cuss at length Hunter's reasoning. There is no doubt about the fact
that the Roman Law had no such test. Buckland and McNair,
Roman Law and Common Law, pp. 171-6.
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tunity for there was no rule of the Common Law on this subject.
No general principle had been worked out for determining what
promises created legal obligation and what not. But that may
not have been sufficient to induce the courts to adopt the cause
or consideration rule, if they had not felt that it was already a
part of the Common Law, as set forth in the old and revered
treatise writers.
The doctrine of the Glossators had passed at once into the
writings of the early French and English jurists. We find it in
our own Glanvill in the 12th Century. He says a person may
owe or become obligated for various causes, and then proceeds
to speak of cause in connection with each of the common types
of contract.56 The notion that every actionable promise must
be supported by a legitimate cause, is even more clearly stated
in the Norman custumal of the 13th Century. It reads, "Ex
promiisso azitern nemo debitezur constituitur, nisi causa preces-
serit legitima pronittendi." The French text says, "Auleun
n'est estably debiteitr pozur pronzesse qu'il face, se il ny eust
droicte cautse de promettre."' 7  And Bracton imported the
system of the Glossators, and his epitomators Fleta and Britton
repeated it.5s About one point they were quite clear-Ndum
pactio nonz parit actionzem. It was that maxim which had led
astray the Glossators and all those who accepted their doctrine.
And St. German in his "Dialogue of Doctor and Student",
which first appeared in 1530, followed suit.50
Thus all the great treatise writers, from Glanvill to St.
German in the 16th Century, were unanimous on the point that
for every contract there must be a cause. It is probably that
fact, more than any other which induced the courts to accept the
doctrine.
Unlike the courts of the Civil Law, those of the Common
Law generally have paid little attention to the doctrines of
jurists. The Common Law has been made by the courts. But in
Glanvill X 3: Is qui patit pluribus ex causis debitum petere
potest, aut enim debitur ei quid ex causa mutui, aut ex causa vendi-
tionis, aut ex commodato, aut ex locato, aut ex deposito, aut ex alia
justa debendi causa.
"' Summa p. 215; Ancienne Coutume (Ed. de Gruchy), c. 91 (90)
-as quoted in Pollock and Maitland-History of English Law-2nd
ed., Vol. II, p. 212.
" Pollock and Maitland-History of English Law (2nd ed.), Vol.
II, p. 196-7.
" Wald's Pollock on Contracts, 3rd ed. by Williston, p. 190.
K. L. J.-3
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this very important matter of consideration it would seem that
the courts simply took over a doctrine, apparently without
discussion or consideration. It was a matter that both bar and
bench had been taught as students as being a rule of the Roman
Law, and also of the law of England. But unfortunately the
requirement of cause or consideration was, as a matter of fact,
not a rule either of the Roman Law or of the law of England.
It may be admitted however, that if the judges of the king's
courts had taken the trouble to review the precedents, they
might have extracted from them precisely the rule which they
adopted, apparently without consideration. If the judges had
considered the various types of contracts which had been held
legally binding they could easily have seen cause in all of them.
In most of them such as sale, exchange, and loan, something had
in fact been given to the promisor which could be considered
the cause. In the surety contract, the request made by the
surety could be reputed the cause.
On the other hand it was quite certain that a purely
gratuitous promise, a promise to make a gift, was not actionable.
No precedent could be found holding a promisor on such a
promise. Persons who desired to make promises of gifts, which
would bind them legally, did so either by contract of court
record, or by recognizances under seal, which by admitting the
obligation formally, put it out of their power to subsequently
retract.
If such were the precedents; if wherever there was
mutuality, where the promisor had received a benefit, or some-
thing was done by the promisee at the request of the promisor,
the promisor could be held legally; and if on the other hand
whenever the promise was to make a gift, he could not be so
held, the judges themselves might by the inductive method have
arrived at the consideration test, though in doing so they would
have fallen into error.
In the 16th Century the Common Law was not sufficiently
mature for the extraction of a principle by such method. If the
courts had waited before making a generalization, as they did
in the case of the rules as to offer and acceptance, until the
19th Century, they would not have arrived at the existing rule
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as to consideration. The falsity of it would have been apparent,
because there would have been a long series of precedents on
which to test it, some of which would not fit in.
The great pity is that the courts of law did not perceive the
true test, as did the courts of Equity, in the matter of uses.
They came very nearly doing so when they said of promises
under seal, that the seal "imports consideration". In that
phrase "consideration" is used in its primary sense as synony-
mous with "deliberation". They evidently meant by that,
when a person employs the formal sealed contract he thereby
shows his intent to deliberately bind himself; his promise is not
made hastily, without consideration. If consideration had been
employed in that sense, as a substitute for cause, it would have
been perceived that the ultimate test was intention to be
legally bound. It would have been quite right to say, that the
fact that the promisor recived a benefit may be taken as sufficient
evidence of his intent to be legally bound, and also that wherever
the promisee has changed his position at the request of the
promisor there is sufficient evidence of intent. The error lay in
taking such proofs of intent, instead of intent itself, as the test.
For it by no means follows that unless the promisor has received
a benefit, or the promisee suffered a detriment, that the promise
is not made with the requisite intent. For example where a per-
son promises to pay a debt barred by the Statute of Limitations,
or a debt discharged in bankruptcy, or to perform a voidable
promise, there is intent to be bound legally, and such promises
are upheld, although other reasons are given by the courts for
making the exceptions to the consideration rule.60
But unfortunately the "consideration" which was
substituted for "cause" had by a transition of ideas, come to
mean the thing which was considered, the inducement for the
promise. In connection with conveyancing it had already
acquired such a secondary meaning. That led to a confusion of
ideas. It obscured the true principle. What really happened
was that the courts adopted a form. They were not content to
say that, if such form were present they would recognize the
I The various sorts of promises, including the three mentioned,
which the courts have been forced to hold valid, even though there is
no consideration, are to be found in secs. 86-90 of Restatement of the
Law of Contracts of The American Law Institute.
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contract as legally binding; they went on and said that unless
the form of consideration was found to be present the contract
would not be recognized.
To prove that the test of consideration is false and useless
all we have to do is to classify promises in accordance with the
true principle; that is, on the basis of whether they are of a
sort intended to give rise to legal consequences or not.
And first let us eliminate those which are not intended
seriously. Matters of banter do not create contractual obliga-
tions, even where the promises are supported by perfectly good
consideration.6 ' Serious promises may be divided into two
classes: A. Those intended to have legal consequences, and B.
Those which are intended to be a matter of honor only.
In class A. we find the ordinary business transactions, all
of which are held to be legally binding. They fall into two
groups: (1) promises for wliich a valuable consideration is
given. These comprise 99 per cent of the cases which come
before the courts. They may be unilateral, promises for which
a thing or act or forbearance is given; or bilateral, promises for
which promises are exchanged; and (2) promises for which no
valuable consideration is given in exchange, such as promises
to pay debts barred by the Statute of Limitations, or discharged
in bankruptcy, or to perform voidable promises, which are held
binding by way of exception to the consideration rule.
In class B. we may place:
(1) social engagements which may be for good considera-
tion; and
(2) Liberalities for which no consideration is given.
If I ask you to dinner and you accept, I have promised you a
dinner and you have promised me the honour of your company.
Each promise is supported by a consideration and yet nobody
would think of bringing an action for the breach of such an
engagement. In the case of promises of liberalities it is certain
that in 99 cases out of a hundred the promisor does not intend
to bind himself legally. In the hundredth case we may very
well insist that if we are to hold it legally binding that we must
require the promisor as evidence of such an intent to employ
some form which will unequivocally prove such intent.
Keller v. Holderman, 11 Mich. 248 (1863).
CIVnI LAw CAUSE
Why make exception in the case of promises to pay debts
barred by the Statute of Limitations, discharged in bank-
ruptcy, to perform voidable obligations, and hold them legally
binding when no consideration has been given in exchange?
Obviously because in all those cases the intention was that they
should affect the legal relations of the parties. Why on the other
hand hold that promises made in jest, and social engagements,
although upon good consideration, are not legally valid?
Obviously because such promises are not intended to affect the
legal relations of the parties. Thus since the other classes of
contracts, which are held valid because there is a valuable con-
sideration, could quite as well be held so on the ground of
intent, the courts are in effect employing the consent test.
True they go through the motions, and ostensibly apply the
consideration test. They must, as long as they are saddled with
it. They cannot openly come out and say that the question of
whether there is an intent to affect the legal relations of the
promisor is the true and only test. All they can do is to apply
the true test under the guise of employing the consideration test.
Not that the courts consciously apply the intent test, but when
it comes to the pinch, that is, whenever it would make a
difference, they instinctively resort to it. That is the only
satisfactory explanation of the exceptions which they make, and
of the further fact that in cases where the intent is absent, even
though there is consideration, they hold the promise not legally
valid.
This point is made even more clear when we recall that the
courts have never attempted to apply the consideration test to
any sort of promise where it is in a formal contract. They do
not say that the test does not apply, but that the seal of the
Common Law formal contract, "imports consideration". What
does that mean? Is that the idea of the Glossators that form
is one sort of cause; or does it mean precisely what it says, that
the seal indicates that the matter has been considered? If the
latter, it is an implied admission that the true test is intent.
The very purpose for which formal contracts have existed is to
mark the intent. Any ceremonial which is associated in men's
minds with contract making serves to call the attention of the
parties to the fact that they are entering into a legal relation-
ship. If then the parties go through the ceremony of signing,
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sealing and delivering a written instrument, it is certain that
the promise therein contained is made with consideration,
deliberately with the intent of affecting legal relations.
Modern considerationists speak slightingly of the court's
dictum that the seal "imports consideration"; and without
giving us any satisfactory explanation of why an exception is
made as to formal contracts, content themselves by saying that
the consideration test applies only to informal. All of which
shows conclusively that the consideration test is false; quite as
much so as the doctrine of cause in the Civil Law. Is not a
generalization which does not generalize a sorry one? First, it
begins by making an exception of all contracts of whatever sort,
if made formally. Then even as to certain informal contracts
it is forced to make further exceptions. That on the other hand
intent is the true test is shown by the fact that it is absolutely
general, that it need admit no exceptions. For not only are all
the exceptions of the consideration rules based on the intent test;
but all of the cases in which the consideration test is applied
with success would be decided the same way by the intent test.
It is said in Buckland and McNair, Roman Law and Com-
mon Law,62 "Is it not possible that we might have escaped the
the doctrine of consideration entirely if the judges of the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries had preferred to adopt as a
test of enforceability the difference between a promise intended
to affect the promisor in his legal relations and one intended to
affect only his social relations or his duties as a man of honour ?
See for instance Weeks v. Tybald (1604) Noy 11 ("general
words spoken to excite suitors"); Balfour v. Balfour (1919)
2K. B 571 ; Rose and Frank Co. v. Crompton (1923) 2K.B. 261;
1925 A.C. 445. The consideration test may have appeared
simpler, but it has led to much artificiality."
However, it may be said that even if the consideration test
is not perfect, even though one must admit exceptions, it works;
it can be applied successfully to the great majority of cases.
If so, is it not a rough practical test which serves its purpose?
Has it not proved its utility? But it by no means follows from
such premises that the rule is useful. Even admitting that it
works perfectly in nine hundred and ninety-nine cases out of a
" P. 177 in footnote
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thousand which come before the courts, it may be quite unneces-
sary to apply it to any of them. It may be impossible to go
astray if it were not applied.
It happens in practice that not only the nine hundred and
ninety-nine, but usually the thousandth contract case also, are
business affairs. People simply do not bring social engagements,
nor promises of liberalities before the courts. Their grievances
due to breaches of such engagements do not get even as far as
the offices of lawyers. The instinct of the public in this matter
is certain. They know what a contract is; that only such
engagements as are intended to affect the legal relations of the
parties are contracts. In nine hundred and ninety-nine of the
contracts, something has in fact been given in exchange for the
promise. That is the usual thing in business affairs. People are
not in business for their health. As to such contracts the courts
could not be mistaken, even without the assistance of the con-
sideration test. They could be depended on to recognize a
contract, and to distinguish it from other engagements, by the
fact that it is of a sort which people make with the intention of
affecting their legal relations.
As to the thousandth case it generally concerns a promise
which, though not given in exchange for anything, is of one of
the categories held to be exceptions to the rule; and the promise
is upheld on some other ground. That means, that in much less
than one case in a thousand, is a promise held to be invalid for
want of consideration. Cases frequently occur where the
engagement is held not legally enforceable for want of
"sufficient consideration." But that is quite a different matter.
Such cases correspond to those in Civil Law jurisdictions in
which promises are held to be not legally enforceable because
of cause illicite. There is a consideration, but they are thrown
out on account of the object. Their enforcement would be
contrary to public policy. There is absolutely no excuse, as was
said above in connection with Smith and Smith's case, to talk
about "want of sufficient consideration" in such cases. Again
cases frequently occur where there is a failure of consideration,
which corresponds to fausse cause in the Civil Law, but they
also have nothing to do with the requirement of consideration,
which must be present at the inception of a contract.
KFNTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
Thus the courts in fact are not aided in the slightest degree
by the application of the consideration test. It would seem
hardly necessary to demonstrate that, as it has been proved
before taking up consideration that such a test is quite unneces-
sary. If the Roman Law got on very well without it, and if all
modern Civil Law jurisdictions do also, it stands to reason that
Common Law countries can also. The actual result of the rules
as to consideration is practically a nullity, as far as the decisions
of the cases are concerned.
It has been said above that in Civil Law jurisdictions
exactly the same results are reached by not applying the test of
cause as would be reached if that test were applied. It may
here be said that substantially the same results would be reached
in Common Law jurisdictions if the test of consideration were
not applied. As an illustration of that, I shall return to my own
personal experience. In the thousands of contract cases which
have come before me on the bench of a Civil Law country, I can
say without hesitation that not a single contract which was up-
held would have been thrown out, if the Common Law considera-
tion test had been applied.
I cannot of course say that no promises have ever been held
legally invalid in Common Law jurisdictions for want of con-
sideration which would have been upheld in Civil Law courts.
There must be some. But they are very rare. If that is all
that the rule requiring consideration has accomplished, it is not
much to its credit. It amounts only to having in a very few
cases succeeded in frustrating the intent of the parties, and
hence of having produced a few judgments that shock the
conscience. 63  Except in those rare cases the rule has
accomplished nothing.
In view then of the enormous labor which for the past three
or four centuries the applying of the test has caused to
professors and law students, bench and bar, and to writers of
articles, we may conclude that the story of consideration, like
that of cause, is Much Ado about Nothing.
The contrast between the Civil Law and the Common Law
jurisdictions however, is great. In the former, bench and bar
have tacitly ignored the requirement of cause; in the latter they
have conscientiously applied the equally futile consideration
'"McDevitt v. Stokes, 174 Ky. 515, 192 S. W. 681 (1917).
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test. The one slipping into the cases, without discussion, as the
judicial adoption of a doctrine taught by law teachers and
treatise writers, has been taken seriously; the other coming as
a legislative fiat in the codes, has never been taken seriously, and
is never applied in the cases coming before the courts. Conse-
quently in Common Law countries it is a case of Much More Ado
about Nothing.
